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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
Case No 
vs. 
14466 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves whether a sale of a certain used refinery reformer is entitled to 
exemption as an "isolated or occasional sale" under the Utah Sales and Use Tax Acts (Utah 
Code Annotated §59-15-2(e) (1953, Repl. Vol. 1974), where (1) the seller used the refinery 
reformer in its business prior to the sale, (2) the seller is not engaged in the business of 
selling refinery reformers and (3) the seller has never sold a refinery reformer as a completed 
unit prior to the subject sale. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The State Tax Commission determined a use tax deficiency against petitioner, Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware, in the amount of $30,375.00, plus interest thereon, attributable 
solely to the purchase by petitioner of a used refinery reformer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks reversal of the determination of the State Tax Commission of the use 
tax deficiency against petitioner in the amount of $30,375.00, plus interest thereon, on the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ground that undisputed facts show that the transaction is exempted from the tax as an 
isolated and occasional sale. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts and a Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, 
and the State Tax Commission based its written findings of fact solely on said written 
stipulations. References in this Statement of Facts will be to the paragraph numbers of the 
State Tax Commission's findings. 
Gulf Oil Canada, Limited (hereinafter "Gulf") sold a used reformer to the petitioner, 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware (hereinafter "Husky"). A reformer is a piece of refinery 
equipment. Husky thereafter caused the used reformer to be located at its refinery in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Fd. No. 10. 
The subject refinery reformer had been used by Gulf in its refinery opertions at Moose 
Jaw, Saskatchewan, Canada. Gulf, at the time of its purchase of the refinery reformer, paid 
a Canadian use tax and was not subject to another sales or use tax on the sale of said 
reformer to Husky in that there is an exclusion from the Canadian tax where the tax has 
already been once paid. Fd. No. 4. 
The sale of the subject used reformer to Husky was the only sale of completed unit that 
Gulf has made. Fd. No. 15. The sale was occasioned by the fact that Gulf made a decision 
in the late 1960's to consolidate the three refineries previously located at Calgary, Moose 
Jaw and Saskatoon at a new 80,000 barrel refinery at Edmonton, Alberta. Fd. Nos. 5 and 6. 
During 1971, Gulf disposed of certain surplus equipment located at Gulf's Calgary, Moose 
Jaw and Saskatoon refineries. Fd. No. 13. The equipment was made surplus when the 
refineries were shut down or converted to terminals supplied by Gulf's new enlarged 
Edmonton refinery. Fd. No. 13. The reformer was sold to Husky in 1971 for a purchase 
price of $675,000.00. Equipment sales by Gulf to firms other than Husky totaled some 
$95,000.00 and covered some 20 unit items of equipment sold at prices marginally over 
scrap value. In addition, some 39 storage tanks and miscellaneous equipment items were 
scrapped at a sales price of $36,000.00. Fd. No. 13. 
Gulf does not sell refinery equipment or machinery (including refinery reformers) in the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pursuit of its regular course of business, but may sell refinery equipment upon economic 
obsolescence or upon closing a refinery installation in connection with a consolidation of 
plants where the equipment is surplus to Gulf's requirements. Fd. No. 3. 
Gulf does not hold itself out as a seller of reformers. Fd. No. 4. Gulf's policy is to 
retain reformer units until economic obsolescence, except on the occasion of a relocation 
where the reformer becomes surplus to Gulf's requirements. Fd. No. 4. 
POINT I 
FOR THREE DECADES, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPALE THAT 
THE UTAH SALES AND USE TAX ACT EXEMPTS SALES NOT 
MADE IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF A BUSINESS OF A 
PERSON SELLING TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY WAS REC-
OGNIZED BY ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AND 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND THE RECENT ACTION OF THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, WHICH ATTEMPTS WITHOUT LEGIS-
LATIVE AMENDMENT TO ABROGATE THE EXEMPTION, IS 
ARBITRARY, ERRONEOUS AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The established meaning of the Utah statutory exemption of isolated and occasional 
sales is that "no sale is taxable if it is not made in the regular course of a business of a 
person selling tangible personal property." The express statutory exemption shows 
legislative intent to limit the scope of the types of transactions that are intended to be 
subject to the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. Contemporaneously with the enactment in 1937. 
of the statutory exemption for isolated and occasional sales, the State Tax Commission 
recognized in promulgated regulations the legislative intent to limit the scope of the tax to 
sales made in the regular course of a business of a person selling tangible personal 
t 1/ property. 
The scope of the statutory exemption has been interpreted by this Court on two 
occasions (respectively in 1949 and 1969) to exclude from the tax sales not made in the 
regular course of business of a person selling tangible personal property. 
In the case now before this Court, the State Tax Commission has made a finding that 
this sale was not made in the regular course of business of a person selling tangible personal 
1/ It appears that the sales and use tax regulations on isolated and occasional sales, 
quoted by the Supreme Court in Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 
178, 209 P.2d 208, 212 (1949), are the regulations which were issued by the State Tax 
Commission on November 1, 1937. The Reply Brief of plaintiff in the Geneva Steel Co. 
case, on page 12, refers to the fact that the use tax regulations then in effect adopted the 
sales tax regulations which were revised November 1, 1937. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machin -generated OCR, may contain errors.
property, but yet has nevertheless held that the transaction is subject to the tax. At this 
point, petitioner would note that the use tax is designed to only pick up tax on transactions 
that would have been subject to the Utah Sales Tax, if the transaction had taken place in 
Utah. Thus, an exemption from the sales tax also applies to the use tax. L. A. Young Sons 
Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 978 (1969) and Union 
Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879. The question 
is, therefore, whether the subject transaction would be taxable if the seller were found in 
Utah and the transaction had taken place in Utah. 
The basis of the Commission's decision is that if Gulf were found in Utah, it would be 
required to obtain a sales and use tax license. This basis is stated in the Commission's 
decision in Conclusions of Law Nos. 8 and 9. It is not disputed that Gulf does make retail 
sales and would be required to obtain a license, if found in Utah. The exemption, however, 
does not vanish simply due to the existence of license, as the Commission contends. 
The pertinent regulation is Sales Tax Regulation S-38. It was amended in 1971 -^ to 
provide as follows: 
No sale of tangible personal property made by a person licensed 
to collect sales tax is considered to be isolated or occasional even 
though the tangible personal property was used by the seller in his 
regular business prior to the sale. However, any sale of an entire 
business is not deemed to be a taxable sale and no tax will apply 
to the sale of any assets made part of such a sale (with the 
exception of vehicles subject to registration) provided that the entire 
business is sold to a single buyer. 
Sales Tax Regulation S-38 (1973) (emphasis added). The present regulation ties the 
availability of the isolated and occasional sale exemption to whether or not the seller has a 
license to collect the tax. Traditionally, a sale of capital assets, used by the seller in his 
business but no longer needed, has been exempt under the Utah isolated and occasional sale 
exemption. With the exception of the sale of an entire business, the current regulation, 
2/ The Commission's decision in Conclusion of Law No. 8 indicates the regulation 
was changed subsequent to the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case, and the historical 
note on the bottom of the Commissioners' published regulations (authored by the 
Commission) indicates the change was probably made on April 13, 1971 and effective July 
1, 1971. Due to the unavailability of past Commission regulations, petitioner's attorney is 
uncertain of the precise date of the change, but is advised by representatives of the State 
Tax Commission that it occurred subsequent to the appeal of the L. A. Young Sons 
Construction Co. case. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
above quoted, now states in substance that any sale by a license holder is not exempt "even 
though the tangible personal property was used by the seller in his regular business prior to 
the sale." Sales Tax Regulation S-38. 
At all relevant times prior to the contested amendment to the regulations, however, the 
regulations of the State Tax Commission provided that "no sale is taxable if it is not made 
in the regular course of a business of a person selling tangible personal property." See 
Regulation S-38, quoted in L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
23 Utah 2d 84, 85, 457 P.2d 973, 974 (1969) and Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 116 Utah 170, 177, 209 P.2d 208, 211 (1949). Under these regulations, a retail 
business was not deemed to be engaged in the business of selling its capital assets, and the 
sale of such tangible personal property was not deemed to be within the scope of 
transactions intended to be taxed under Utah Sales and Use Tax laws. 
The change in the regulations is a complete reversal, leaving no exemption where one 
previously existed. It sidesteps issues previously resolved by this Court in favor of taxpayers, 
and directly conflicts with the Court's statutory interpretation. 
The Utah statute definitely contemplates an isolated and occasional sale exemption. 
The statute provides as follows: 
The term "retail sale" means every sale within the state of Utah 
by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, except sales 
defined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by the terms of 
this act; but the term "retail sale" is not intended to include 
isolated nor occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business. . . 
Utah Code Annotated, §59-15-2(e) (1953, Repl. Vol. 1974) (emphasis added). The 
exemption should be applicable unless the seller is making the sale in the regular course of 
his business, and any other interpretation nullifies the exem "tion as hereinafter explained. 
At the hearing below, the representative of the Office of the Attorney General 
explained the extremely restrictive interpretation of the exemption that is found in the 
current sales tax regulations as follows: 
. . •/ would submit that this [exemption] applies only to situations 
where people are not regularly engaged in retail sale of any kind. 
In other words, a garage sale where a housewife or someone who 
disposes of an old regrigerator they have. . . . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Transcript, page 21, lines 17 through 21 (emphasis added). See, also,transcript, page 
27, line 7. 
Individuals, such as a housewife who has a garage sale, however, do not in the first 
instance make a "retail sale" as defined by statute. A housewife, therefore, need not rely on 
the isolated and occasional sale exemption. The statute defines the term "retail sale" as a 
sale "by a retailer or a wholesaler to a user or a consumer." Utah Code Annotated, 
§59-15-2(e). Thus, only sales by "retailers" or by "wholesalers" are taxable. A retailer or a 
wholesaler in turn are defined by statute to be persons doing a "regularly organized" 
wholesale or retail business. Utah Code Annotated, §§59-15-2(c) & (e). Since the housewife 
is not in a regularly organized retail or wholesale business, the housewife, who has a garage 
sale, is not making taxable sales within the meaning of the statute and the definition of a 
"retail sale." 
Since the sales tax applies only to sales made by persons who are retailers or 
wholesalers, the exemption, if it does not apply to these individuals, has no practical 
meaning or effect. It becomes meaningless surplusage in the statute. By contending that the 
exemption only applies to persons who do not make taxable sales in the first instance, the 
Commission essentially takes the position that there is no exemption for isolated and 
occasional sales in Utah. 
POINT II 
REGULATION S-38 IS WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH AND A 
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE DECISIONS OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT WHICH INTERPRET THE SCOPE OF THE 
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALE EXEMPTION. 
A. Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 
209 P.2d 208 (1949). 
The Geneva Steel Co. case held that in Utah a sale not made in the regular course of 
business of a retailer is exempt from the tax as an isolated and occasional sale. This case is 
the first occasion upon which the scope of the "isolated or ocasional sale" exemption was 
before this Court. The War Assets Administrator had sold the Geneva Steel plant at 
Geneva, Utah, for $40 million to the Geneva Steel Corporation. The State Tax Commission Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machin -gener ted OCR, may contain errors.
contended, inter alia, that the War Assets Administration "was engaged in the business of 
selling surplus government property." Since the entire plant was in a sense government 
surplus, the Commission contended the selling of such integrated business by them was not 
an "isolated or occasional sale." 209 P.2d at 213. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this 
and other contentions of the State Tax Commission and held that the subject sale was an 
isolated and occasional sale within the meaning of the exemption in the statute. 
In reaching its decision, the Utah Supreme Court commented on the nature of the 
exemption in Utah and on the State Tax Regulation No. 38, which was then in effect. The 
Court stated: 
The above [Utah] regulations, as well as those of other states 
which we have examined, definitely contemplate an isolated or occasional 
sale as one made by a person while not in the pursuit of the regular 
course of his business of selling tangible personal property. . . . 
116 Utah at 178, 209 P.2d at 212 (emphasis added). Current Regulation S-38 is a complete 
rejection of the holding of this Court in the Geneva Steel Co. Case. 
The Court in the Geneva Steel Co. case did not approve and interpret the then existing 
regulations without first analyzing their validity and the nature of the exemption. The Court 
cited and quoted with approval the interpretation in the regulations of several other states of 
the term "isolated and occasional" sales. This quote is exerpted only to the extent that a 
portion thereof bears directly on the point at issue here: 
[1. Connecticut regulation was quoted by the Court] 
A "retail sale" as defined . . . shall not include the following 
casual or isolated sales which are exempt from tax: 
(b) Sales of articles of tangible personal property required 
for use or other consumption by a retailer or seller which 
are not sold in the regular course of any business engaged 
in by such retailer or seller. 
[2. Ohio's regulation was quoted by the Court, and the following 
example is an exerpt from this quote[ 
[W]here a grocer sells his cash register, counters or other store 
fixtures at auction or otherwise, such persons are not "engaged in 
the business" of selling tangible personal property at retail with 
respect to this property, but are making casual or isolated sales. 
[3. In regard to Illinois regulations, the Court stated] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Under Article 1 of the Illinois regulations the selling of tangible 
personal property as machinery and other capital assets by a retailer 
which he has used in his business and no longer needs and which 
he does not otherwise engage in selling as a part of his regular 
business is an isolated and occasional sale. 
116 Utah at 177, 209 P.2d at 212. All three examples quoted by the Court, which are 
regulations of taxing authorities in other states, exemplify the point which was made by this 
Court in its decision and which is directly applicable here. For example, the Ohio regulation 
states that when a grocer sells his cash register, counters or other store fixtures at an auction 
or otherwise, such persons are not "engaged in the business" of selling tangible personal 
property at retail with respect to this property. On the contrary, they are making casual or 
isolated sales as that term is used in virtually all jurisdictions having such as exemption. 
Similarly, the Illinois regulation, above quoted, states that the selling of capital assets by a 
retailer, where the retailer has used such assets in his business and no longer needs them, is 
an isolated and occasional sale. 
The Commission in its current Regulation S-38 attempts to limit the holding of the 
Court to the facts of that particular case. There must be a sale of all the assets of a business. 
The sale must be to a single buyer. The current regulation provides: 
However, any sale of an entire business is not deemed to be a 
taxable sale and no tax will apply to the sale of any assets made 
part of such a sale (with the exception of vehicles subject to 
registration) provided that the entire business is sold to a single 
buyer. 
Sales Tax Regulation S-38 (1973). If there are two buyers or if there is a sale of only part of 
the assets of a business, the exemption does not apply. If the precise facts do exist, however, 
the Commission in current Regulation S-38 concedes that a license holder has made an 
isolated and occasional sale. 
Such a narrow reading of the Court's holding in the Geneva Steel Co. case is not 
consistent with the principle upon which the decision was based. The Commission's current 
regulation, further, is internally inconsistent in that a license holder may make an isolated 
and occasional sale when an entire business is sold to a single buyer, but, with this 
exception, no other sale by a license holder is an isolated or occasional sale. 
In Conclusion of Law No. 7, the Commission distinguished the Geneva Steel Co. case 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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on the ground that the ''seller [War Assets Administrator] was not engaged in the business 
of selling his entire business." We would submit that Gulf is equally not engaged in the 
business of selling its refinery equipment, and hence the cases are indistinguishable. 
B. L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission 
23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969). 
In this case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the sale of equipment, used by a 
contractor in its business, was an isolated and occasional sale within the meaning of the 
Utah statute. It is petitioner's position that the holding of the Supreme Court of Utah in 
L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. is dispositive of the issues in the case at bar. 
The decision of the Supreme Court notes the following facts. Amis Construction 
Company ("Amis"), an Oklahoma corporation, had used a large amount of construction 
equipment on a job in Wyoming. Rather than transport the construction equipment which it 
had used on the job back to Oklahoma, Amis decided to sell some of the equipment. To 
facilitate the sale, Amis engaged the services of an auctioneer. 
The decision recites that the taxpayer (L. A. Young Sons Construction Co.) had 
purchased "a number of items at the auction which resulted in the Tax Commission levying 
a use tax deficiency thereon." The Court does not in its decision give further detail on the 
amount of the equipment which was involved, for the reason, it is submitted, the nature of 
the sale and of Amis' business was dispositive on the issues in the case. We would note that 
the State Tax Commission's brief to the Court argued that Amis had sold over 232 pieces of 
equipment for a total selling price of $789,737.50, of which six were purchased by the 
taxpayer at a price of $139,500.00. Brief of Defendant, at page 2. 
The portion of Sales Tax Regulation S-38, which was quoted by the Court in this 1969 
decision, is substantially unchanged from the portion of the same regulation which had been 
quoted by the Utah Supreme Court in its 1949 decision in the Geneva Steel Co. case. The 
regulation still contained the provision "no sale is taxable if it is not made in regular 
course of a business making retail sales . . . . " Another portion of the then existing 
regulation which was brought to the attention of the Court by the taxpayer in taxpayer's 
Brief read as follows: 
On the other hand, the sale of fixtures and appliances used in a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
clothing store are not subject to tax when the merchant sells them 
in the course of his modernization program. 
Regulation S-38, quoted in Brief of Plaintiff on page 13. 
The Court noted that Amis was engaged in the business of constructing highways, 
roads, bridges and like projects, and had never been engaged in the business of selling 
construction equipment nor in making retail sales. 
This Court held that "the sale of equipment here in question was an isolated or 
occasional sale and therefore clearly within the exemption [for isolated and occasional sales] 
of the statute referred to." The Court further stated that it saw "no valid distinction" 
between the case at hand and the Geneva Steel Co. case. 
The holding of the Court in the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case cannot be 
reconciled with the position of the Commission in this proceeding. The Court's holding in 
the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case should be compared to the position of the 
representative of the Office of the Attorney General in his argument before the State Tax 
Commission. He stated: 
In other words, a retailer operates an orange and apple stand 
selling apples and oranges. He finally reaches a point where the table is 
too old to hold the oranges and apples and he runs and [sic] ad in the 
paper to sell his table. The question then is, is there a sales tax on the 
sale of his table although he regularly sells apples and oranges? 
The petitioner would say yes, he is entitled to an exception as an 
isolated sale. I would submit that he is not . . . . 
Transcript, page 20, lines 2 through 9 (emphasis added). The position which the 
Commission seeks to establish in this proceeding cannot be reconsiled with this Court's 
prior decision on the subject. 
In the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case, the State Tax Commission was 
essentially urging this Court that the number of sales or the gross amount of money 
involved in the sales by the contractor in that case were sufficient in number, scope and 
character that they could not be isolated and occasional sales. The Court in its decision 
expressly rejected this argument: 
The Tax Commission urges us to follow the decisions of the California 
Supreme Court which have construed sales such as the one involved 
here as not being within the exemption of the isolated or occasional 
sales provision. However, it should be noted that the California 
10 
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statute is not similar to the Utah statute. The California statute 
provides that a series of sales sufficient in "number, scope and 
character" to constitute an activity requiring the holding of a seller's 
permit is not an occasional sale. The terms "sales sufficient in number, 
scope and character" are not a part of the Utah statute, and we 
do not believe that the court should construe the statute as including 
those terms. 
457 P.2d at 974 (emphasis added). The response of the State Tax Commission was not 
to acquiesce in the holding and decision of the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case. 
Instead, the State Tax Commission attempted to overrule the case by promulgating a 
regulation directly in conflict with the case. In Conclusion of Law No. 8, the State Tax 
Commission distinquishes the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case on the grounds that 
subsequent to that decision the Commission adopted the provision in the regulation that 
' 'there is no isolated or occasional sales exemption when there is a series of sales sufficient 
in number, scope and character to indicate that the seller is regularly engaged in the business 
of selling tangible personal property." The precise language of current Sales Tax Regulation 
S-38 on this point is as follows: 
The sale of used fixtures, machinery and equiment items by nonlicense 
holders is not an exempt occasional sale where such sale is one of the 
series of sales sufficient in number, amount and character to indicate 
the seller deals in the sale of such items. 
Regulation S-38 (emphasis added). The Court in its decision in the L. A. Young 
Sons Construction Co. case did not state that the regulations of the Commission did not 
contain the terms "sales sufficient in number, scope and character," but rather the Court 
stated that the Utah statute did not contain these terms. The California statute is, as this 
Court has said, entirely distinguishable. If the Commission desires a result tailored after the 
California statute, the proper course is to request the legislature to modify the Utah statute. 
It is beyond the power of the Commission to modify the statute by amending its regulations. 
The fulcrum of the Court's holding was that the contractor was not engaged in the 
business of selling its construction equipment. Similarly, Gulf used the subject reformer in 
its refinery operations and is not engaged in the business of selling refinery reformers or 
refinery equipment. Indeed, the subject sale is the only sale of a completed unit that Gulf 
has made. It is respectfully submitted that there is no valid distinction between the facts of 
the case at bar and the L. A. Young Sons Construction Co. case. 
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POINT III 
COURTS IN OTHER STATE JURISDICTIONS HAVE CONSTRUED 
THEIR ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALE EXEMPTION IN THE 
MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
As noted by the Supreme Court in the Geneva Steel Co. case, its interpretation 
of the Utah statute was in accord with interpretations of isolated and occasional sale 
exemptions in other state jurisdictions. Since the decisions of this Court are controlling 
on Utah law, we do not desire to burden this Brief with a lengthy discussion of the 
numerous cases that support petitioner's position and the construction found in prior 
3/ decisions of this Court. Some of these cases, however, are cited in the footnote. 
We will discuss very briefly only two cases from other state jurisdictions. 
Tennessee had a statute that was substantially identical to the language in Utah's 
statute, and a Tennessee case reviewed an attempt by the local taxing authorities to abandon 
prior regulations that exempted sales not made in the regular course of business. The 
Tennessee court properly rejected the attempt of the local taxing authorities to amend the 
statute by promulgating regulations. Liberty Cash Grocers, Inc. v. Z. D. Atkins, 304 SW2d 
633, 202 Tenn. 448 (1957). The Tennessee statute was substantially identical to the Utah 
statute in the pertinent part and provided as follows: 
The term "business" shall not be construed in this Act to include 
occasional and isolated sales or transactions by a person who does not 
hold himself out as engaged in business. 
304 SW2d at 634 (emphasis added). The Tennessee Supreme Court Stated: 
While the complainant was engaged in the business of selling tangible 
property, it was not engaged in the business of selling tangibles 
such as its fixtures and equipment. In support of this conclusion, it must 
be presumed that when the merchandise and equipment in question was 
acquired for complainant's own use, the law was complied with, and said 
personal property had, therefore, already been burdened with a sales tax. 
3/ See, e.g., Maine Aviation Corporation v. Johnson, 196 A.2d 748 (Maine, 1964) M. 
L. Virden Lbr. Co., Inc. v. Stone, 203 Miss. 251, 33 So. 2d 841 (Supreme Court ot 
Mississippi, 1948); Doolittle v. Johnson, 250 A.2d 822 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 
1969); State v. Bay Towing and Dredging Co., 265 Ala. 282, 90 So.2d 743 (Supreme Court 
of Alabama, 1956); Green v. Pederson, 99 So.2d 292 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1957); 
Richard Bertram & Co. v. Green, 132 So.2d 24 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1961); 
Calvert v. Marathon Oil Company, 389 SW2d 153 (Texas, 1965). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Casual or isolated sales may be where a person sells his automobile 
or a merchant sells his store fixtures or a person sells a quantity of 
lumber and in such cases this person is not engaged in selling 
property within the meaning of the Tennessee Sales Tax Act. 
304 SW2d at 635 (emphasis added). Similarly, the reformer was a fixture of Gulf. It is 
stipulated that Gulf is not engaged in the business of selling refinery reformers, and, indeed, 
the subject sale is the only sale of a completed unit that Gulf has ever made. 
The Texas Supreme Court recently reviewed an issue similar in principle to the issue 
before this Court. The local taxing authorities (Texas Comptroller) argued that the 
exemption for isolated and occasional sales in the Texas statute did not apply to any person 
engaged in the business of making retail sales. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the 
Comptroller's position that a "retailer" could not make an occasional sale under the 
exemption for the simple reason that "retailers" were the only persons who made taxable 
sales under the terms of the Act in the first instance. Big Three Industries, Inc. v. Keystone 
Industries, Inc., All SW2d 850 (Texas Civil Appeals, 1971). The Court stated: 
If the "occasional sale" provision applied to that definitition, then 
there could be no such thing as an occasional sale because all 
occasional sales would be made by persons exempted from the sales 
tax in the first place. 
All SW2d at 852 (emphasis added). For similar reasons, the current provisions of Utah 
provision S-38 would render the exemption under Utah law a nullity, since the only 
individuals or entities the Utah exemption would then apply to do not make taxable sales in 
the first instance. 
Not only case laws of other jurisdictions, but also the regulations of the state tax 
authorities in other states have almost uniformly adopted such interpretations when similar 
statutory language is involved. On page 18 of the taxpayer's Brief to the State Tax 
Commission, the regulations of several taxing authorities in other states, interpreting 
language almost identical to the Utah statutory exemption, were cited and quoted. (Indeed, 
the Utah State Tax Commission would fall into the category of so interpreting the 
exemption, until the recent amendment in 1971.) In the Appendix of the petitioner's Brief to 
the State Tax Commission, the statutes and regulations of over half of other state 
jurisdictions were quoted, and these statutes and regulations show that it is the definite Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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policy of most state jurisdictions to exempt isolated and occasional sales under the 
circumstances of this case. 
It is submitted that the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court control this case, and 
there is no need to look to the law of other state jurisdictions. This section is included in our 
Brief only to point out that the decisions of the Court on this subject are in accord with 
interpretations of other state jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The subject reformer was used by Gulf in its refinery operations prior to the sale to 
Husky. Gulf does not hold itself out as a seller of refinery reformers, and the subject sale of 
a reformer is the only sale of a completed unit that Gulf has made. While Gulf was engaged 
in the business of selling oil, gas and related products at retail, Gulf never engaged in the 
business of selling refinery reformers. If the sale had been made in Utah, it would have been 
exempt from the Utah Sales Tax as an isolated or occasional sale. It is therefore exempt 
from the Utah Use Tax. 
The determination of the State Tax Commission that petitioner is liable for a use tax 
deficiency in the amount of $30,375.00, plus interest, is in error. 
DATED this 2£$ day of April, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
William A. Marshall 
Attorneys for 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware 
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